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THE EFFECTS OF NETWORK’S STRUCTURAL HOLES: POLYCENTRIC 
INSTITUTIONS, PRODUCT PORTFOLIO, AND NEW VENTURE GROWTH IN 
CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
 
This study examines the effect of network’s structural holes, i.e., the absence of a link 
between two contacts who are both linked to an actor, on product development and profit 
growth of software ventures in two different institutional contexts of China and Russia. 
Using interview data of 159 software entrepreneurs in Beijing and Moscow, the study 
found that the effect of structural holes is contingent upon country institutional context 
and venture development stage. Specifically, structural holes have a positive main effect 
on product portfolio but a negative main effect on profit growth in the second revenue 
year - early stage of venture development. Structural holes are more useful in the Russian 
institutional context compared to the Chinese institutional context due to the 
polycentricity of institutions. The research implications of the findings are discussed. 
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The network concept of structural holes defined as the absence of a link between two 
contacts who are both linked to an actor has become a popular notion in the social capital 
research (Brass et al., 2004; Burt, 1992). The networks rich in structural holes were 
referred to as entrepreneurial networks, and the person who profits from structural holes 
is regarded as an entrepreneur in the literal sense (Burt, 1992: 34). The previous studies 
of structural holes in managerial networks produced contradictory results. On the one 
hand, scholars found that structural holes have a positive effect on managerial career and 
entrepreneurial success (Batjargal, 2007a; Burt, 1992; 2004; Podolny and Baron, 1997), 
and on the other hand, researchers documented that structural holes hinder managerial 
promotion (Podolny and Baron, 1997; Xiao and Tsui, 2007). Meanwhile, institutional 
theorists argue that the way in which networks affect dependent variables is embedded in 
local institutional contexts (Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne, 1993). Will institutional 
diversity and polycentricity explain the effect of network’s structural holes on dependent 
variables? 
Prior research on structural holes in managerial networks examined this 
phenomenon exclusively in a single country context, for example, United States (Burt, 
1992) or China (Xiao and Tsui, 2007).Therefore, one of the reasons for conflicting 
findings of the previous studies may be that it did not reflect diverse institutional contexts 
across countries in which networks are built, maintained and mobilized. Given the 
tremendous institutional diversity around the world (Ostrom, 2005), would the effects of 
structural holes on entrepreneurial success be different across countries?  
As an attempt to provide a partial answer to this question, the current study 
examines the role of structural holes in entrepreneur’s networks in product development 
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and financial performance of new ventures in the comparative contexts of China and 
Russia. Thus, the main objective of this study is consistent with a recent call for more 
local context-specific research of international entrepreneurship (Cumming et al., 2009).  
 The extant research on entrepreneurial networks largely focused on inter-
organizational networks (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Stam, 2010; Stuart, 
Hoang and Hybels, 1999; Stuart and Sorenson, 2007), entrepreneurial team networks 
(Aldrich and Kim, 2007; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter, 
2003), and entrepreneur’s network size and composition (Batjargal, 2000; 2003a; 
Renzulli, Aldrich, and Moody, 2000). In contrast to previous studies, I examine the effect 
of structure of personal networks of entrepreneurs on new venture product portfolio, i.e., 
the number of software products developed for different product-market segments, and 
profit growth. Specifically, I address the following three questions. First, do network’s 
structural holes affect product development and profit growth of new ventures? Second, 
do national institutions (i.e., Chinese versus Russian) moderate the effect of structural 
holes on product portfolio of new ventures? Third, does product portfolio of new 
companies moderate the effect of structural holes on profit growth? 
 Drawing on social network theory and the institutional diversity literature (North, 
2005; Ostrom, 2005), I propose hypotheses on structural holes, product portfolio, and 
profit growth of new ventures in China and Russia. I use telephone interview data of 159 
entrepreneurs – founder-CEOs of software ventures that are 6 years old and younger. In 
order to study the effects of structural holes in non-Western and cross-country contexts, I 
have interviewed software entrepreneurs in China and Russia, two large emerging 
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economies with divergent institutional trajectories (Batjargal, 2007b; 2007c; Djankov et 
al., 2006; Hitt et al., 2004; North, 2005; Scott, 2000; Shleifer, 2005).  
 The main contributions of this study are twofold. First, this study argues that the 
effect of structural holes on dependent variables is moderated by polycentric institutions. 
The concept of polycentric institutions refers to a system where actors are able to 
organize not just one but multiple governance rules at differing scales rooted in local 
beliefs, knowledge, and situations (Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne, 1993). 
The divergent institutional transformations in China and Russia are resulted in different 
institutions or polycentric institutions in the two countries. This is a relatively new 
theoretical idea in management and entrepreneurship research. By examining structural 
holes, product portfolio and profit growth in China and Russia, this study compares 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial processes in two different institutional environments. 
Therefore, this study makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the emergent 
literature on international entrepreneurship (Cumming et al., 2009). Second, by exploring 
main and indirect (interaction) effects of network’s structural holes on dependent 
variables, the article contributes to the structural holes argument of social network theory 
because it identifies boundary conditions for structural hole effects.   
This article is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe the institutional 
diversities in China and Russia. In the conceptual framework, I propose four hypotheses. 
This is followed by the methods part. In this section, I describe the software industries in 
the two countries, the survey data, the variables and measurements, and the construct 
validation procedures. In the results section, I report the findings and the robustness 
analyses. In the discussion part, I discuss the contributions, the implications, and the 
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limitations of this study. The conclusion section summarizes the findings and their 
implications. 
INSTITUTIONAL POLYCENTRICITY IN CHINA AND RUSSIA 
Institutions are defined as multifaceted, durable social structures composed of regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive elements (Scott, 2001). Institutional transformation is 
regarded as changes in the formal regulations and informal social norms that influence 
actors’ behaviors (North, 1990). China and Russia as emerging economies are 
experiencing unprecedented institutional changes. This institutional transformation is 
characterized as a dual process: On the one hand, it is a deinstitutionalization process that 
is reflected in the erosion and discontinuity of institutionalized organizational activities 
and practices (Oliver, 1992). On the other hand, this is an institutionalization process that 
is reflected in the growth of novel regulative rules and norms that facilitate or constrain 
actors’ behaviors (Scott, 2001). Deinstitutionalization refers to the delegitimization of 
established rules, structures, and organizations. Specifically, deinstitutionalization is the 
process by which the existing structures, organizations and norms are rejected, 
discredited and dismantled due to the political, economic, and social pressures (Oliver, 
1992). On the contrary, institutionalization is the creation and legitimization of new and 
emerging regulations, organizations, and norms. Institutionalization is the process by 
which growing regulative, normative, and organizational elements gain appropriateness, 
acceptance, and creditability. Therefore, institutionalization is driven by the rule-setting, 
the self-reinforcing feedback dynamics of legitimacy, and the taken-for-grantedness of 
novel systems and organizations (Colyvas and Powell, 2006). 
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Although the dual processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization occurred 
in China and Russia simultaneously in the 1990s, the Chinese transformation may be 
characterized as a gradual institutionalization process, whereas the Russian transition 
may be described as a rapid deinstitutionalization process (North, 2005; Scott, 2000). 
These divergent institutional transformations result in polycentric institutions when 
formal and informal rules are embedded in unique local beliefs, knowledge, and settings 
(Ostrom, 2005). The polycentric institutions are reflected in diverse social networks and 
relations, and these effects are stronger in emerging economies (Ostrom et al., 1993). 
In contrast to Russia, China has adopted the reform path of gradualism that resulted in 
the limited political reforms, staged economic liberalization, and sequenced privatization. 
The Chinese leadership carried out simultaneous political centralization and economic 
and fiscal decentralization (Shleifer, 2005). China’s communist institutions were not 
discredited. On the contrary, they were reformed and revitalized, and arguably, gained 
some legitimacy among at least the Han Chinese majority in China. The Chinese 
Communist Party abandoned the ideology of peasant dictatorship and class struggle, and 
admitted private entrepreneurs to broaden its social base. While the Chinese communist 
party has consolidated its absolute dominance of the legislature, judiciary, media, security 
forces, and military, it effectively transferred power in areas of economy, education, and 
culture to non-party bureaucracies. The newly emerging organizations such as regulatory 
agencies, financial institutions, and private firms are trusted to a certain degree in China. 
In this way, the dual processes of the emergence of new rules and the survival of the old 
institutions provided China with relative institutional stability. Thus, China blends 
communist political system with capitalist market economy. The rising institutional 
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framework in China is of a hybrid type of communist-capitalist regulations, organizations 
and informal norms (Nee, 1992; Scott, 2000). 
In contrast to China, Russia has chosen the path of rapid political and economic 
liberalization, and massive privatization of state-owned enterprises. Russia quickly 
replaced the communist political system by a multi-party system, and carried out political 
decentralization that shifted much of the political power from the center to local 
governments (Shleifer, 2005). Furthermore, the Russian federal government introduced a 
series of rules and mechanisms that were designed to control Russia’s regions fiscally 
through new systems of budget and taxation. While the Russian political reforms in the 
1990s dismantled the Soviet-type rules and organizations, they did not create effective 
democratic and market-oriented norms, structures, and organizations. For example, the 
Russian financial institutions and oligarchic firms that grabbed assets through the 
privatization schemes in the middle of 1990s are widely distrusted and despised because 
of the persistent economic crises, inflation, and corruption (Goldman, 2003; Spicer and 
Pyle, 2002). While Vladimir Putin’s centralization policies in the 2000s brought some 
stability to the Russian institutions, it failed to build and nurture sustainable economic 
regulations and norms (Goldman, 2008; North, 2005). Thus, the institutional framework 
in Russia can be characterized as a setting where the old regulations and organizations 
were dismantled but the new rules and structures are ineffective and illegitimate. 
The absence of formal rules or the presence of dysfunctional regulations leads to the 
rise of informal norms and networks that generate relatively stable environments for 
economic actors (North, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1993). Both China and Russia have unique 
informal institutions of guanxi (connections) networks and svyazi (connections) networks 
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accordingly (Batjargal, 2007c; 2008; 2010; Xin and Pearce 1996). Scholars found that 
Chinese guanxi ties facilitate job mobility (Bian, 1997), enhance firm performance 
(Batjargal, 2003b; 2007a; Park and Luo, 2001) and enable entrepreneurs to raise venture 
capital (Batjargal and Liu, 2004). Likewise, Russian svyazi relationships reduce 
uncertainties in financial transactions (Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001), enhance firm 
performance (Batjargal, 2003c; 2005; 2006) and facilitate entrepreneurs’ access to 
resources (Sedaitis, 1998). 
I expect that the relative institutional stability in China and group-oriented norms of 
guanxi may create conditions where structural holes will not facilitate product 
development. On the contrary, the institutional void (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) 
prevailing in Russia as a reflection of deinstitutionalization and highly context specific 
features of svyazi norms moderate positively the effects of structural holes on product 
development of new ventures. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The theory of structural holes states that actors with networks rich in structural holes reap 
two types of benefits: access to information, and control through brokerage (Burt, 1992: 
13). The information benefit is the timely access to nonredundant information, 
opportunities, referrals and resources. The brokerage benefit is the power, information 
control, and resource gains of the third party from playing two actors against one another. 
Consistent with these assumptions, I propose that structural holes in entrepreneur’s 
personal networks facilitate product development (portfolio) of software ventures through 
several mechanisms: timely access to nonredundant information and referral sources, 
discovery of new opportunities and resources in distant network clusters, combination of 
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diverse knowledge and technology (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997), and the transitivity 
mechanism when the entrepreneur links directly two previously unconnected ties 
(Granovetter, 1983). 
The access to nonredundant information exposes venture founders to diverse 
technological, product design and market information located in socially and 
geographically distant network clusters (Schach, 2002). Software entrepreneurs learn 
from bridging ties what applications are demanded and favored in different market 
niches, and what modules, functions, design features, algorithms and languages are 
combined and used in what ways to produce various applications in technically novel yet 
cost efficient ways (Stam, 2010).  
Third-party referrals help venture founders to access greater pools of actors who 
generate diverse information (Batjargal and Liu, 2004). The referees as information 
filters reduce search and deployment cost of information gathering (Burt, 1992). The 
matching principle in referral practices, i.e., connecting two actors whose interests are 
similar, helps software developers to access the desirable codes and design elements at 
the right time (Fernandez, Castilla and Moore, 2002).  
By mobilizing low-density networks that contain numerous structural holes, 
entrepreneurs identify and exploit opportunities to form external alliances (Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1996) and embed their programs in hardware and middleware systems 
of other producers. Entrepreneurs who spin boundaries of fragmented domains of ideas, 
artifacts and people (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) re-combine creatively various software 
elements to produce new programs. 
Structural holes 
 
11 
 
Network transitivity may be beneficial to software development. Transitivity is a 
property that considers patterns of triples of actors in a network. A triad is transitive if 
every time AB relation and AC relation leads to BC relation (Granovetter, 1983). 
Transitive property enables entrepreneurs to link previously disconnected software 
engineers to write new programs. Based on these discussions, I propose: 
Hypothesis 1: Structural holes in entrepreneur’s networks have a positive effect on 
product portfolio (number of software products) of new ventures. 
 
In the following section, I contrast the moderating role of Chinese and Russian 
polycentric institutions in the relationship between structural holes and product portfolio. 
I propose that the effect of structural holes on product portfolio will be stronger in Russia 
than in China for two reasons. First, the Russian institutional transformation generates 
more structural holes in networks and greater opportunities for entrepreneurial brokerage 
compared to China (Batjargal, 2007c; Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Sedaitis, 1998). 
Second, the informal social norms in Russia encourage brokerage activities in contrast to 
China where the traditional values and norms regard brokering as opportunistic and 
selfish that is needed to be sanctioned (Frye, 2000; Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Ledeneva, 
1998; Xiao and Tsui, 2007). Thus, Russian entrepreneurs are likely to benefit more from 
structural holes than Chinese entrepreneurs who have fewer brokerage opportunities and 
whose social costs of spanning structural holes are likely to be higher. 
The Russian institutional reforms resulted in the comprehensive restructuring of 
the existing organizations, regional and industry-wide networks, and professional 
associations (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). The dismantling of the massive Soviet 
bureaucracies, privatization of state-owned enterprises, layoffs, and downsizing lead to 
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unemployment and displacement (Kharkhordin and Gerber, 1994). This forced Russian 
entrepreneurs to create new networks and clusters that serve as substitutes for nonexistent 
or weak institutions (Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2008; Batjargal, 2003a; Sedaitis, 
1998). This may have increased structural holes in networks over time. Arguably, 
Russian society is more mobile both geographically and occupationally because of the 
more liberalized labor market and the elimination of the Soviet residential permission 
system - propiska. Prior research has found that Russian entrepreneurs were more mobile 
than their Chinese counterparts (Djankov et al., 2006). This mobility has led to low-
density networks that generated brokerage opportunities. Indeed, first private firms that 
emerged in the post-Soviet Russia were commodity exchanges where intermediaries 
brokered between commodity sellers – state-owned enterprises and buyers – new private 
firms (Batjargal, 1998; Frye, 2000). Therefore, brokerage is regarded as a legitimate 
business activity in Russia. 
In contrast to Russia, the gradual institutionalization enabled Chinese 
entrepreneurs to preserve their work-related networks and build cohesive networks over 
time (Dai, 2002; Segal, 2003; Zhou, 2007). The institutional and organizational 
continuity reduced membership turnover in the Chinese networks. Social stability in 
China is conducive to sustainable socializations of actors and in this way, it made the 
networks of Chinese entrepreneurs redundant and overlapping. Further, the rigid 
residential permission system – hukou, and the state employment system - danwei in 
China constrain free flows and migrations of people including entrepreneurs between 
different localities. This restricts professional networking opportunities of Chinese 
entrepreneurs. In a survey study, Djankov et al., (2006) found that Chinese entrepreneurs 
Structural holes 
 
13 
 
had lived in fewer localities, and held fewer distinct professional positions than their 
Russian counterparts. In case of Chinese software entrepreneurs, Saxenian and Quan 
(2005) concluded that closed guanxi networks of software entrepreneurs with government 
officials and former employers (state-owned enterprises) hindered their firms’ growth and 
development.  
It is reasonable to assume that Russian and Chinese venture founders equally 
benefit from nonredundant information in dispersed networks. Therefore, the access to 
nonredundant information generates no gains or advantages for either groups of 
entrepreneurs relative to other. This mechanism of structural holes may not have as 
salient implications for venture success as control or brokerage when one compares 
Chinese and Russian ventures. 
Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs perceive entrepreneurial brokerage differently. 
Brokerage is a process by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between other 
actors lacking access to or trust in one another and gain power and resources by charging 
“commissions” each time they broker an exchange (Marsden, 1982). Social actors may 
prefer different roles in brokerage situations including that of the coordinator and 
integrator (Xiao and Tsui, 2007), and the controller who deliberately plays actors against 
one another and actively pursues the strategy of “the third who benefits” (Burt, 1992: 30). 
While the Russian entrepreneur plays the role of the controller in svyazi networks (Frye, 
2000; Sedaitis, 1998), the Chinese entrepreneur rejects the control aspect of brokerage in 
guanxi networks (Batjargal, 2007a). 
The Chinese entrepreneur may not be motivated as much as the Russian 
entrepreneur to play the role of the controller and generate gains from intermediary 
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positions for a number of reasons. The controlling action that creates competition 
between sides and increases bargaining power of the central actor is not congruent with 
the Chinese manager’s propensity to be more group-oriented relative to the Russian 
manager (Ralston et al., 1997). Chinese entrepreneurs are aware of the potential risks and 
negative reactions of other stakeholders to brokerage because it is regarded as 
exploitative in China (Batjargal, 2007c; Xiao and Tsui, 2007). The Chinese may not gain 
from brokerage as much as the Russians because they are likely to be less experienced 
and prepared to manipulate information and maximize power in the intermediary 
positions. These attributes often make Chinese entrepreneurs less willing to span 
structural holes. The lack of motivation to broker between contacts in turn is likely to 
reduce returns from networks for Chinese entrepreneurs. However, the cost of building 
and maintaining structural holes and bridging ties in networks is likely to remain 
unchanged (Burt, 1992). Thus, Chinese entrepreneurs bear the cost (time and resources) 
of bridge building and maintenance but benefit less from them because they do not 
engage in active brokerage, i.e., playing two actors against one another. In contrast, the 
Russians gain more because they benefit from both access to nonredundant information 
and brokerage. These outcomes produce network ineffectiveness and greater opportunity 
costs for the Chinese entrepreneurs. 
When the Chinese entrepreneur chooses to play actors against one another and 
generate value from disunion, the returns may not be as high as those achieved by the 
Russian entrepreneur in similar situations. The Chinese entrepreneur’s brokerage is 
perceived as illegitimate because many stakeholders, including software developers, 
suppliers and buyers, regard brokerage as an unethical and harmful action. The social 
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disapproval of brokerage may tarnish reputation of Chinese brokers because Chinese 
networks tend to be more cohesive where members scrutinize each other’s behavior 
intensely (Saxenian and Quan, 2005; Xiao and Tsui, 2007). 
Chinese entrepreneurs who play the role of the controller in triads, i.e., triple 
actors, are likely to be penalized by other stakeholders because this violates the normative 
prescriptions of the Chinese to be group-oriented. This may be especially true if the 
controller is a new entrepreneur, and the others are more established players. This will 
substantially reduce material and intellectual gains from brokerage for Chinese business 
owners. Overall, Chinese entrepreneurs may not gain from network’s structural holes as 
much as Russian entrepreneurs because of the motivation and legitimacy constraints. This 
affects product development negatively for the Chinese entrepreneurs. Based on these 
discussions, I propose: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between structural holes in entrepreneur’s 
networks and product portfolio (number of software products) of new ventures will be 
stronger in Russia than in China. 
 
Next, I propose that network’s structural holes have a negative effect on profit growth of 
new ventures in the early stages of venture creation and development. At early stages of a 
venture life cycle, for example, second revenue year (Reynolds and White, 1997), 
structural holes in networks may hinder venture growth through the following three 
mechanisms. First, at the beginning, a nascent entrepreneur may have difficulties to 
coordinate among and communicate with various network members who do not know 
each other. This slows down decision-making to exploit new opportunities (Reynolds and 
White, 1997). Second, obtaining financial and knowledge resources from disconnected 
contacts requires more time and efforts because there is less trust among ties, and 
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members feel less obliged to help (Batjargal, 2007a; Sedaitis, 1998). Third, although 
dispersed networks generate nonredundant information, contradictory, conflicting and 
sometimes even distorted information about market demand for software product and 
strategies of rival firms may prevent founders to formulate and implement consistent 
product development and sales strategies at the early stages (Coleman and Verbruggen, 
1998; Schach, 2002). Thus, the coordination and communication difficulties, constrained 
resource mobilization, and unfocused strategies as a reflection of ambiguous information 
may hinder profit growth of new ventures in the early stages of development. I propose: 
Hypothesis 3: Network’s structural holes have a negative effect on profit growth at the 
early stage (second revenue year) of new venture development. 
 
 Finally, I hypothesize that the negative effects of structural holes on profit growth 
are strengthened when new ventures develop numerous software products for various 
product-market segments. When entrepreneurs develop many software applications, the 
communication difficulties with socially distant software writers turn into confusion 
about product development priorities and piece-meal, uncoordinated actions that hinder 
venture growth (Schach, 2002). The constrained resource mobilization from distant ties 
and simultaneous development of several software applications are likely to spread 
limited knowledge and financial resources thinly across many product lines. This results 
in low quality, incomplete and incompatible software products that hard to sell and 
generate profits (Coleman and Verbruggen, 1998). The contradictory information about 
various market segments gathered from disconnected weak ties and unsynchronized 
efforts to expand product variety often result in inconsistent sales and marketing 
Structural holes 
 
17 
 
strategies and tactics. This is reflected in lower profit growth for entrepreneurs who have 
dispersed networks and large product portfolio. Therefore, I propose: 
Hypothesis 4: The interaction effect of structural holes in entrepreneur’s networks and 
product portfolio on profit growth will be negative at the early stage (second revenue 
year) of new venture development. 
 
METHODS 
Software industry contexts 
The Chinese software industry. The roots of software firms in China are traced to four 
sources: research institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, university research 
laboratories, R&D institutes of government ministries, and entrepreneurial startups.  The 
total sales of software and system integration products in 2003 (the year when the 
interview data were collected) were worth US$19.3 billion, a 45 percent growth year-on-
year. By the end of 2003, there were 8582 domestic software vendors (People’s Daily, 
2004). Roughly 70 percent of these firms are small firms that employ fewer than 50 full-
time employees (Tschang and Xue, 2005). China’s software exports reached $3.6 billion 
in 2002 (Business Weekly, 2003). China’s software industry grew at a compound annual 
growth rate of more than 39 percent over the period from 2001 to 2007 to reach RMB506 
billion (Chinese currency - Yuan) and is further anticipated to grow of nearly 22 percent 
through 2012 (Software industry in China, 2008). Scholars emphasized the importance of 
both formal and informal (guanxi) institutions in software development in China 
(Saxenian and Quan, 2005; Tschang and Xue, 2005).  
The Russian software industry. Russian software ventures resemble the Chinese firms in 
terms of origin, with two important differences. Like the Chinese vendors, many 
originated in the Soviet/Russian Academy of Sciences, university laboratories, and 
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government R&D institutions. In contrast to China, many successful software ventures 
are spin-offs from the Soviet/Russian military-industrial complex, which still produces 
advanced weaponry systems, including software. Most Russian vendors are private 
startup firms. The Russian IT industry including software grew at 30-40 percent annually 
from 2000 to 2006. Russian software exports grew from $120 million in 2000 to $1.8 
billion in 2006, and Russia is the third largest software exporter after India and China 
(Economy of Russia, 2010). At the end of 2002, there were more than 2000 domestic 
software companies (Burgess and Travis, 2005). The average revenue growth of software 
makers was 50-60 percent in 2002 (Ekspert, 2003). Most Russian firms are small, 
employing fewer than 45 people and generating revenues about $2.5 million a year. 
Sample and interview data 
I use a telephone survey data of 82 Russian entrepreneurs in Moscow and 77 Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Beijing. The interviews were conducted in June-October 2003. In total, 
118 respondents were CEOs, and 41 respondents were chief technology officers (CTO). 
The technical directors were interviewed only in those occasions when the CEO was 
unavailable, director was a member of the founding team, and the firm has more than 50 
full-time employees.  
Collection of primary survey data of new ventures in emerging economies is a 
particular challenge in international entrepreneurship research (Cumming et al., 2009). I 
used the following four criteria to sample new, dedicated and domestic software ventures 
in China and Russia. First, venture must be 6 years old or younger to qualify as a new 
venture (Zahra, Ireland and Hitt, 2000). Second, firm should be registered as a software 
firm. Third, venture should be owned fully by domestic shareholders. Finally, I study 
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software ventures in high tech regions, i.e., Beijing and Moscow, because of higher 
chances of sampling high-growth start-ups rather than self-employed entrepreneurs or 
low-growth, life-style businesses.  
In China and Russia, there are no complete electronic and other data of new firms 
like, for example, the Dun and Bradstreet database in the United States. Therefore, my 
research assistants and I used varieties of information sources1, i.e., telephone directories, 
membership lists of local entrepreneurial associations, electronic databases, new venture 
directories of consulting and venture capital companies, and data bases of local 
governments, to identify new software firms. Although this sampling approach is less 
systematic, it enabled us to sample more and diverse ventures, and arguably, made our 
samples more random. We created a list of 111 new, dedicated and domestic ventures 
based in Moscow. The positive response rate for the Russian sample is 73 percent (82 
entrepreneurs responded). In Beijing, we created a list of 172 ventures. The positive 
response rate for the Chinese sample is 44 percent (77 entrepreneurs responded). The 
overall response rate is 52 percent (159 entrepreneurs responded from the total of 283 
entrepreneurs). This compares favorably with most network surveys (Marsden, 1990; 
2005). 
The questionnaire was designed in English. Teams of Chinese and Russian 
management professors translated it into Mandarin Chinese and Russian, and back 
translated the questionnaire. I pre-tested the questionnaire with three Russian and two 
Chinese entrepreneurs. Two research assistants and I conducted interviews in Moscow, 
                                                 
1 The complete lists of sample sources in Russian, Mandarin Chinese, and English are available upon request from the 
author. 
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and the team of six research assistants carried out interviews in Beijing. Each interview 
lasted approximately in 25 minutes.  
Measures 
Independent variables. There are two methodologies commonly used to measure personal 
(ego-centric) social networks: the name-generator and the position generator. The name 
generator has been used widely in the network literature (Burt, 1992; Marsden, 1990; 
2005). Although less common than first method, the position generator methodology has 
also been used fruitfully in management research and sociology (Belliveau, O’Reilly and 
Wade, 1996; Lin and Dumin, 1986).  
Both methodologies have their own strengths and weaknesses. The name 
generator method allows one to measure structural properties of networks, i.e., density 
and structural holes, more thoroughly than the position generator. In addition, the name 
generator enables one to track down changes in personal networks of individuals over 
time. However, the name generator method may be biased towards strong ties since 
people are likely to remember well the interactions with strong ties (Lin, 2001). 
An advantage of the position generator method is that it captures occupational or 
positional characteristics of network members - alters. The method also enables one to 
collect data on strong and weak dyadic ties simultaneously (Lin, 2001). The downsides of 
the position generator are limitations to conduct thorough structural analysis of networks, 
e.g., calculation of network constraint and structural holes, and the potential bias of social 
desirability, i.e., respondents may overestimate the number of powerful, resourceful and 
prestigious contacts. 
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In this study, I use the name generator method because the methodology enables 
me to capture structural holes in ego-centric networks of entrepreneurs. The question that 
was used to generate contact names is as follows: ‘The next questions are about those 
with whom you often discuss issues related to software programming and design. Please 
name those persons with whom you have discussed software programming issues over 
the last six months.’ Thus, the network content or type is the discussion network about 
software programming and design. This question generated maximum eight names. The 
question that captured network structure is: ‘The next question is to describe the strength 
of relations between listed people. You do this by circling codes in the matrix below (See 
Appendix). This is a complex question, but it is essential to measuring of social networks 
– and answering the question is a simple task when taken one column at a time. Begin 
with the first person listed. Relations with the first person are listed in the third column. 
Indicate his or her relationship with the person in each row in one of three ways: Circle E 
if there is an especially close relation between the row person and the first person. Circle 
D if the row person and first person are distant in the sense that they rarely work together, 
are total strangers as far as you know, or do not enjoy one another’s company. Leave E D 
blank to indicate that two people are neither distant nor especially close’ (Burt, 1992). 
Structural holes is measured as the percentage of ‘distant’ relationships of all possible 
relationships within network of each respondent. Burt’s (1992) network constraint is 
often used to measure structural holes. I calculated structural holes as ‘1 minus network 
constraint score.’ However, the percentage of ‘distant’ relationships provided stronger 
empirical results2. Therefore, I use this measurement. Institutions are measured by 
country dummy variables: China is coded as one, and Russia is coded as zero.  
                                                 
2 The network constraint score and the regression analyses with structural holes measured as 1 minus network 
Structural holes 
 
22 
 
Dependent variables. Product portfolio is the number of product-market segments where 
the firm sold packaged software products and applications. The respondents were given a 
list of 14 market segments of packaged software, and were asked to indicate in which 
segments the firm sold packaged software. I measure packaged software products 
because they are standardized and clearly classified into groups. The fourteen product 
market segments include accounting software, general management, enterprise planning, 
customer relationship, supply chain, e-government, systems software, education, 
middleware, embedded software, database, general office, home software, and others 
(e.g., games, anti-virus, industrial, etc). I used software product classifications of the 
Chinese Software Industry Association, the China Software Union, the Russian National 
Software Development Association, the Russian Anti-software Piracy Association and 
published sources. These sources generated 11 overlapping product segments in two 
countries, and 3 non-overlapping segments were added to the list. The information 
suggests that software product markets are comparable in two countries. I employ this 
measurement for product portfolio for the following reasons: First, the goal of this study 
is to examine the number of products developed for different product-market segments 
rather than product diversification, and therefore, this measurement is consistent with the 
research objective. Second, the traditional entropy measurement of product 
diversification may not be appropriate for new ventures. Finally, a similar measurement 
for product portfolio has been used in a previous study (Rothaermel, Hitt, and Jobe, 
2006). Profit growth is measured as the percentage of profit growth in the second revenue 
year. I measure profit growth in the second year of revenue generation because I 
                                                                                                                                                 
constraint are available upon request from the author. 
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theorized that structural holes and product portfolio will affect profit growth in the early 
stages of venture development. 
Control variables. Firm age is the number of years from venture registration. Firm size is 
measured by the number of full-time employees. Venture capital is a binary variable of 
one if private equity was raised and zero otherwise. Ownership is a binary variable of one 
if the major shareholder is the respondent and zero otherwise (Zahra et al., 2000). 
Network size is the number of contacts named (Marsden, 1990; 2005). 
Data and construct validity. In order to check the common methods bias and the social 
desirability bias, my research assistants made data cross-validation phone calls. During 
the interviews, we asked for phone numbers of one of the contacts listed. In all, 41 
Chinese respondents and 28 Russian respondents provided phone numbers. Selecting 
every second on the list of 41 Chinese contacts, and every second and third on the list of 
28 Russian contacts, we contacted 20 Chinese and 20 Russian contacts and asked each 
contact to describe her/his relationship with the person next on the list in terms of 
‘especially close,’ ‘distant’ and ‘neither especially close nor distant.’ All 20 (100%) 
Chinese answers and 17 (85%) Russian answers were consistent with our data. This 
indicates that the measurement for structural holes is valid. To my knowledge, this study 
is one of the first studies that validated perceptions of the respondent of relationships 
among contacts by asking one contact to characterize his or her relationship with another 
contact. In order to validate profit growth data, I submitted the 2002 profit growth 
information of 15 randomly chosen firms in each city to the Department of Taxation of 
the Haidian district government in Beijing, and the Department of Taxation of the 
Moscow City Government in Russia. Chinese and Russian officials confirmed that the 
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profit information of 12 (80%) Chinese ventures and 11 (73%) Russian firms were 
accurate. James, Demaree and Wolfe (1984) argued that an agreement of at least 80 
percent between multiple raters is necessary to establish reliability. Therefore, I assume 
that the survey data has an acceptable level of reliability and validity.  
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations for all variables of the 
total surveyed sample (N=159). It shows that the mean firm age is 3.33 years 
(S.D.=1.44), and firm size is 47 employees (S.D.=52). The Chinese and Russian ventures 
tend to hire more employees because labor is cheaper, and there are important financial 
and other incentives to generate jobs (Batjargal et al., 2009). Fifty-nine percent of the 
ventures are majority owned by the entrepreneur. Thirteen percent of the new firms raised 
venture capital. The findings on entrepreneur’s age and education are consistent with the 
findings of other surveys of entrepreneurs in China and Russia (Batjargal et al., 2009; 
Djankov et al., 2006). The mean network size is 4.29 (S.D.=1.34) contacts and the mean 
percentage of structural holes is 28 (S.D.=0.28). The mean product portfolio is 2.27 
(S.D.=1.68). The mean profit growth is 3.90 percent (S.D.=6.17). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations (N=159) 
 
 Variables N M S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Firm age 159 3.33 1.44        
2 Firm size 159 47 52 0.31**       
3 Ownership 159 0.59 0.49 -0.09 -
0.28** 
     
4 Venture capital 159 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.17* -0.09     
5 Entrepreneur’s age 159 37 8.33 0.12 -0.12 0.25** -0.14    
6 Entrepreneur’s 
education 
159 2.27 0.74 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.15* 0.08   
7 Network size 158 4.29 1.34 0.12 0.15* -0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.18*  
8 Structural holes % 157 0.28 0.28 0.28** -0.01 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.25** 
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9 Product portfolio 158 2.27 1.68 0.25** 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.30**
* 
10 Profit growth % 145 3.90 6.17 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 0.07 
11 China 159 0.48 0.50 -
0.29**
* 
0.14 -0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 0.00 -0.26**
 
 
 Variables 8 9 10 
     
9 Product portfolio 0.48**   
10 Profit growth % -0.17* -0.07  
11 China -0.43** -
0.55** 
0.01 
 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.  
 
Table 2 reports the One-way ANOVA results of the Chinese and Russian 
samples. It shows that the Chinese networks are smaller and contain fewer structural 
holes. The Chinese ventures are younger, larger, more likely to raise private equity, and 
have fewer software applications. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA of the Chinese and Russian samples 
 
 Variables China Russia ANOVA 
Model 
  N Means S.D. N Means S.D. F 
         
1 Firm age 77 2.89 1.32 82 3.74 1.43 15.29*** 
2 Firm size 77 55.48 54.67 82 40.34 49.33 3.36† 
3 Ownership 77 0.50 0.50 82 0.68 0.46 5.24* 
4 Venture capital 77 0.19 0.39 82 0.07 0.26 5.22* 
5 Entrepreneur’s age 77 36.14 6.99 82 39.18 9.22 5.42* 
6 Entrepreneur’s education 77 2.27 0.89 82 2.26 0.56 0.01 
7 Network size 76 3.92 1.45 82 4.63 1.13 11.82*** 
8 Structural holes % 75 0.15 0.27 82 0.40 0.23 35.87*** 
9 Product portfolio 76 1.31 0.73 82 3.16 1.82 67.75*** 
10 Profit growth % 67 4.02 7.30 78 3.79 5.06 0.05 
 
†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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In Table 3, I present the results of the multiple linear regression analysis 
predicting product portfolio and profit growth. Model 1 is the base model for product 
portfolio. The model is statistically significant (F=3.86, p<0.01). Model 2 shows that 
structural holes in networks (b=0.29, p<0.001) have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on product portfolio. While venture capital (b=0.13, p<0.05) has a positive effect 
on product portfolio, China dummy variable (b=-0.43, p<0.001) has a negative effect on 
product portfolio. The model is significant (F=12.13, p<0.001). Hypothesis 1 is 
supported. 
Table 3. Linear regression analysis: Structural holes, product portfolio, and profit growth 
of new software ventures (N=159) 
 
Variables Product portfolio 
  
Profit growth %  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Control variables      
Firm age 0.23** -0.02 -0.08 0.26** 0.23** 
Firm size -0.07 0.07 0.12† -0.09 -0.09 
Ownership 0.02 -0.09 -0.07 0.13 0.13 
Venture capital 0.08 0.13* 0.13* 0.12 0.12 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.19* -0.19* 
Entrepreneur’s education -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 
Network size 0.29*** 0.10 0.09 0.17† 0.17† 
      
Independent variables      
Structural holes %   0.29*** 0.71*** -0.30* -0.29* 
China  -0.43*** -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 
Product portfolio    -0.05 -0.05 
      
Two-way interactions      
      
Structural holes % * China   -0.52***   
 
Structural holes % * Product 
portfolio 
     
-0.01 
      
Model F 
 
3.86** 12.13*** 16.23*** 2.11* 1.90* 
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Adjusted R square 
 
0.11 0.39 0.49 0.07 0.06 
N 156 156 156 143 143 
 
Values represent standardized B coefficients.  †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Model 3 illustrates that the interaction of structural holes and China dummy 
variable (b=-0.52, p<0.001) has a negative and statistically significant effect on product 
portfolio. The model is significant (F=16.23, p<0.001). Hypothesis 2 is supported. Model 
4 shows that structural holes (b=-0.30, p<0.05) have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on profit growth in the second revenue year. The model is significant 
(F=2.11, p<0.05). Hypothesis 3 is supported. Model 5 reveals the interaction effect of 
structural holes and product portfolio on profit growth. The interaction effect is not 
statistically significant. The effects of entrepreneur’s age (b=-0.19, p<.1) and structural 
holes (b=-0.29, p<0.05) on profits are negative and statistically significant. Network size 
(b=0.17, p<0.1) and firm age (b=0.23, p<0.01) have positive effects on profit growth 
although the effect of network size is marginally significant. Hypothesis 4 is not 
supported. 
Robustness of the results 
In order to check the robustness of these findings, I carried out a number of additional 
statistical analyses. I compared the sample of all surveyed firms (N=159) with the non-
surveyed sample (N=124) by firm age, location (address), and firm website. Location is 
measured as follows: those ventures that were located in Beijing’s Haidian district (the 
so-called Zhongguancun high tech district) and Moscow’s Yugo-Zapad, the area where 
most of Russia’s prestigious universities and R&D institutes are located, are coded as one 
and the others as zero. Firm website is a dichotomous variable of one when the firm has a 
website, and zero when the firm has no website. Firm age, location and firm website are 
Structural holes 
 
28 
 
the three variables on which I have information for the total sample population (N=283). 
The results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 4. The findings show that the surveyed 
firms were slightly older than the non-surveyed firms at the marginally significant level 
(F=2.93; p<0.1). The differences in location and firm website are not statistically 
significant. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA of the total sample populations and 
interviewed samples (N=283) 
 
 Interview  Non-interview ANOVA  
Model 
 N Means S.D. N Means S.D. F 
        
Firm age 159 3.33 1.44 124 3.06 1.17 2.93† 
Location (address) 159 0.83 0.37 124 0.83 0.37 0.01 
Firm website 158 0.87 0.33 124 0.86 0.34 0.06 
 
†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA of the total sample populations and 
interviewed samples by country (N=283) 
 
 China 
 
Russia 
 Interview 
 
Non-interview ANOVA Interview Non-interview ANOVA
 N Means SD N Means SD F N Means SD N Means SD F 
               
Firm age 77 2.89 1.32 95 3.01 1.22 .37 82 3.74 1.43 29 3.22 .99 3.03† 
Location 
(address) 
77 .84 .36 95 .83 .37 .04 82 .82 .37 29 .82 .38 .00 
Firm website 76 .89 .30 95 .86 .34 .38 82 .85 .35 29 .86 .35 .01 
 
†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.  
In addition, I compared the interviewed sample with the non-surveyed sample 
within each country. The ANOVA results are presented in Table 5. The findings illustrate 
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that the differences between the two samples within each city were not statistically 
significant except firm age in the Russian samples (F=3.03; p<0.1). 
 Stuart and Sorenson (2007) documented that the endogeneity and cause-effect 
problem of networks and venture performance is a serious methodological deficiency in 
the network–based entrepreneurship research. Using the collected information on the 
duration of each respondent-alter tie, I calculated the average dyadic (ego-alter) tie age 
for each respondent – the sum of years known of each alter divided by the number of 
alters, and compared it with the mean firm age. While the mean respondent-alter tie age 
is 5 years (S.D.=3.53), the mean firm age is 3.33 years (S.D.=1.44). On average, the 
entrepreneurs knew the network contacts for 2.7 years before venture formation. This 
shows that the vast majority of ties were established before firm was registered. Further, I 
calculated the percent of those ties that were established after the venture was founded – 
‘post start-up ties’ and examined their effects on product portfolio and profit growth. The 
results of the linear regression analysis presented in Table 6 reveal that the effects of post 
start-up ties on product portfolio and profit growth are not statistically significant. Based 
on these findings, I assume that network’s structural holes affected the dependent 
variables rather than outcome variables influenced networks.  
 
Table 6. Linear regression analysis: Post start-up ties, product portfolio, and profit growth 
of new software ventures (N=159) 
 
 Product portfolio 
Model 1 
Profit growth % 
Model 2 
 
Control variables   
Firm age -0.13† 0.27** 
Firm size 0.11† -0.09 
Ownership -0.06 0.11 
Venture capital 0.12* 0.15† 
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Entrepreneur’s age 0.08 -0.18* 
Entrepreneur’s education -0.06 -0.07 
Network size 0.08 0.19* 
Structural holes % 0.70*** -0.26† 
China -0.11 -0.07 
Product portfolio  -0.04 
   
Two-way interactions   
Structural holes % * China -0.53***  
Structural holes % * Product portfolio  -0.04 
   
Independent variable   
   
Post start-up ties % 0.12 0.00 
   
Model F 
 
15.22*** 1.95* 
Adjusted R square 
 
0.50 0.07 
N 156 143 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
DISCUSSION 
This study examined the effect of network’s structural holes on product portfolio and 
profit growth of new software ventures. I found that structural holes in entrepreneur’s 
personal networks facilitate product development because they provide access to 
nonredundant information, diverse resources, and third-party referrals. The entrepreneurs 
whose networks are rich in structural holes combine and re-combine various program 
codes, modules, functions, design features, and languages to produce software 
applications for numerous market segments.  
I theorized that the effect of structural holes on product portfolio is stronger in 
Russia than in China due to the polycentricity of institutions. The rapid 
deinstitutionalization in Russia led to low-density networks rich in structural holes, and 
the Russian social norms accept entrepreneurial brokerage. Therefore, Russian 
entrepreneurs benefit more from network’s structural holes. In contrast, the gradual 
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institutionalization in China is reflected in cohesive networks poor in structural holes, and 
the Chinese group-oriented social customs penalize brokers. Thus, Chinese entrepreneurs 
do not benefit from structural holes as much as Russians because the cost of building and 
maintaining loose-knit networks is greater than the return from these networks in China. 
The study revealed that network’s structural holes inhibit profit growth in the early years 
of venture development because of the coordination and communication problems, 
constrained resource mobilization, and inconsistent strategies.  
Contributions 
This study contributes to the international entrepreneurship literature and the 
structural holes argument of network theory. The study showed that the effect of 
structural holes on dependent variable is moderated by polycentric and diverse 
institutions in China and Russia. The perspective of institutional polycentrism is a 
relatively new theoretical explanation in the entrepreneurship research. This study is one 
of the first studies that examined effects of structural holes in two country contexts – 
China and Russia. Therefore, this article makes both theoretical and empirical 
contributions to comparative studies of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship processes in 
different contexts - a relatively under-researched topic even within the international 
entrepreneurship literature (Cumming et al., 2009). Further, this study is among first 
studies that examined the effect of structural holes in entrepreneur’s personal (ego-
centric) networks on venture development and performance. The findings on the main 
positive and negative effects, and indirect (interaction) negative effects of structural holes 
is a refinement and modification of the structural holes argument because it identifies 
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boundary conditions for network structural holes’ effect. Thus, I claim a contribution to 
the structural holes argument of social network theory.  
In addition, these findings have implications for the institutional theory literature. 
This study tentatively suggests that institutional transformation in emerging economies 
may not be always an isomorphic and unicentric process that results in institutional 
homogeneity. On the contrary, it may contain dual tendencies of isomorphism and 
polycentrism that reflected in institutional diversities around the world. 
Research implications 
While we know that structural holes help entrepreneurs to develop software products, the 
question which of the three mechanisms – information, resources and referrals, plays 
what role in product development remains unanswered. Therefore, further research 
should provide fine-tuned analysis on the actual roles of various network mechanisms for 
product portfolio and new venture performance. Does access to information and 
knowledge generate more benefits than access to diverse tangible resources or third-party 
referrals? Do combinations of three mechanisms produce greater benefits for 
entrepreneurs? 
In this study, I assumed that the presence of structural holes in networks affects 
the outcome variables. However, further studies should distinguish between the presence 
of structural holes and the spanning of structural holes - active brokerage, and examine 
when and why those actors who have loose-knit networks actively span structural holes 
to generate profits. The entrepreneur may play different roles in spanning structural 
holes: the role of the integrator who connects sides and creates value for all triad 
members (Xiao and Tsui, 2007), and the role of the controller who deliberately plays 
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actors against one another and generates profits for him or herself only (Burt, 1992). 
What role a network entrepreneur assumes is likely to depend on personality, cultural and 
social norms, and local settings. 
If network’s structural holes have a negative effect on financial performance in 
the early stages of venture development, a logical question for future research is that do 
structural holes affect positively financial performance in later stages, for example, 
obtaining bank loans or pre-IPO stage. Is the effect of structural holes on outcome 
variables linear or curvilinear? Current research suggests that network’s structural holes 
change over time (Batjargal, 2010). Therefore, why and how structural holes evolve, and 
what implications it has for dependent variables are questions that can be addressed in 
further studies.  
Future research should assess effects of institutions on network structure by 
measuring institutions directly. Does institutional void (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) 
generate entrepreneurial networks rich in structural holes? Does incremental institutional 
evolution (Scott, 2000) produce dense and tight-knit networks that contain fewer 
structural holes? Is the institutional transformation in emerging economies an isomorphic 
and unicentric process that results in increasingly similar institutions in the developed and 
developing economies?  
The newly emergent literature on institutional diversity suggests that formal and 
informal institutions across different countries and cultures are diverse and polycentric. 
This diversity and polycentricity is likely to persist as long as institutions are embedded 
in local beliefs, knowledge, and settings (North, 2005; Ostrom, 1990; 2005). The 
postulate of institutional polycentrism is a promising explanation in institution-based 
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management and entrepreneurship research because it is complementary to the influential 
perspective of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This idea is 
likely to be a beneficial theoretical framework for international and comparative 
entrepreneurship research. Institutional transformation is likely to contain dual tendencies 
of isomorphism, i.e., institutions in different countries become similar over time like 
international accounting regulations, and polycentrism, i.e., unique local features and 
characteristics of institutions in various countries are likely to persist over time like rules 
governing common-pool resources. Do diverse and polycentric institutions in different 
countries produce dissimilar network patterns (Ostrom et al., 1993)? Another question for 
further research is whether formal institutions, e.g., regulations, influence more network 
structure while informal institutions such as social norms affect more relational aspect, 
e.g., trust and tie strength, of networks. The above discussed questions should be 
addressed in future research. 
Limitations 
Like any other study in social sciences, this study has its limitations. I used country 
dummy variables for measuring institutions. Therefore, there is a possibility of an 
alternative explanation for the findings. I acknowledge this as a shortcoming. The 
software industries in China and Russia are young, and therefore, institutional, regulatory 
and market immaturity may have affected these results, although I assume that all the 
entrepreneurs are exposed to the same country conditions to the same extent. The sample 
size is relatively small. The product portfolio measurement is subjective, although this 
measurement suits the country and industry contexts because the Chinese and Russian 
software industries are new industries in relatively new market economies. Although I 
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validated the data through phone calls and cross-checks, the potential common methods 
bias remains an issue. The interviewed sample may be venture survival biased. However, 
I think the potential bias is not systematic to affect the results for the following reasons. 
The empirical evidence suggests that financial performance does not predict firm survival 
in emerging economies (Lyles, Saxton and Watson, 2004). Thus, some financially 
distressed ventures may survive longer while other financially sound firms may 
discontinue. In addition, I control for firm age. The linear regression results in Table 3 
show that the effect of firm age on product portfolio is not statistically significant, and the 
effect of firm age on profit growth is positive and statistically significant (Model 5). I 
checked the distribution of firm age, and found that the distribution is not skewed 
towards older firms in any significant ways. These findings indirectly suggest that 
potential survival bias is not serious in this study. Finally, I use profit growth percent in 
one year (second revenue year), and I acknowledge that this is a limitation. 
CONCLUSION 
This study argued that the effect of network’s structural holes on dependent variables is 
contingent upon country institutional context due to the polycentric nature of institutional 
transformation. Specifically, the usefulness of structural holes for entrepreneurial success 
depends on local institutional characteristics, and venture development stage. Structural 
holes may be more valuable in more diverse and polycentric institutional environments, 
and may be less useful for financial success of ventures in the early stages of their 
development. Future research on entrepreneurial networks should pay a greater attention 
to local institutional factors that influence network patterns. 
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Appendix: The matrix that captures network structure 
 
 Names        
1  1       
2  E  D 2      
3  E  D E  D 3     
4  E  D E  D E  D 4    
5  E  D E  D E  D E  D 5   
6  E  D E  D E  D E  D E  D 6  
7  E  D E  D E  D E  D E  D E  D 7 
8  E  D E  D E  D E  D E  D E  D E  D 
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